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RONALD J. BACIGAL

Hearings on Jury Bias or Misconduct
THE general rule in Virginia and in the federal sys·
tem has always been that "the deliberations of the
jury and the motives which actuate them in arriving
at a verdict are secret and usually even jurors them·
selves will not be allowed to impeach their verdict"
during the polling process or by subsequent affi·
davit. 1 The major exception to this general rule
involves situations where outside influence upon the
jury has affected the defendant's constitutional right
to an impartial jury. In the recent cases of Smith v.
Phillips, 2 and Rushen v. Spain, 3 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that judicial review of ex
parte contacts with a sitting jury may raise a number
of separate but interrelated constitutional rights: (1)
the right to an impartial jury; (2) the right to a due
process post-trial hearing on jury bias; (3) a possible
due process right to a mid-trial hearing on jury bias;
(4) the defendant's right to be present at such mid·
trial hearings; and (5) the right to be represented at
such mid-trial hearings.
As Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion
in Rushen, confusion abounds in identifying these
rights and applying them in a factual context. This
article suggests that the various rights and proce·
dures can best be understood by distinguishing
between post-trial and mid-trial inquiries into jury
bias.
Post-Trial Hearings
In Remmer v. United States, 4 there was a purported
attempt to influence a juror and a follow-up FBI
investigation which included an interview of the
juror. Because the trial judge did not learn of the
situation until after trial, there was no opportunity for
any mid-trial corrective action. The United States
Supreme Court, however, ordered a post-trial hearing
into the impartiality of the juror. and recognized a
presumption of prejudice whict-. · ·.e prosecution must
overcome at the hearing. Because proof of jury bias is
often difficult to obtain in a post-trial hearing/' plac·
ing the burden of proof upon the prosecution often
determines the substantive issue. 6
Although Remmer has not been overruled, the
burden of proof may have been shifted to the defense
in the more recent case of Smith v. Phillips.1 In
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Smith, as in Remmer, the trial judge learned after the
verdict that there might have been juror misconduct.
(During the trial a juror had submitted an application
for employment as an investigator in the District
Attorney's Office.) Because there was no opportunity
for mid-trial corrective action, the defendant was
entitled to a Remmer type post-trial hearing. Surpris·
ingly, the Smith opinion cited Remmer but did not
mention Remmer's presumption of prejudice. The
Supreme Court held that due process merely requires
that the defendant have an "opportunity to prove
actual bias."
It may be that Smith has overturned the Remmer
presumption, however, Smith and Remmer can both
be read as valid law if each is limited to a distinct
situation. Remmer involved third party contact with
a juror, and the presumption of prejudice may apply
only when third party contact exists. Smith, however,
did not involve any third party contact but only the
juror's own possible misconduct which raised the
issue of potential bias. When no third party contact
exists, the Remmer presumption of prejudice may be
inapplicable and the burden to prove actual prejudice
may shift to the defendant. A Fourth Circuit case
questioning the relationship between Remmer and
Smith is before the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiari, 8 but it may be some time before the Court
provides any guidance as to the continuing validity of
the Remmer presumption.
Mid-Trial Inquiries Into Jury Bias
In situations such as Remmer and Smith there was
no opportunity for mid-trial inquiries into jury bias,
thus the defendant was limited to a post-trial hearing
on possible juror misconduct. A different situation
arises, however, when the trial court learns of possi·
hie misconduct or outside influence before the
conclusion of the trial. In Rushen v. Spain, 9 a juror
went to the trial judge's chambers to disclose her per·
sonal knowledge of facts relevant to the case. The
judge questioned the juror about her ability to be
impartial, but the judge made no record of the conver·
sation and did not inform the defendants or their
counsel about the in-chambers conversations. After
trial, defense counsel learned of the ex parte commun·

ications between judge and juror and moved for a new
trial. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirming the granting of a new trial on the grounds
that an unrecorded ex parte communication between
trial judge and juror can never be harmless error.
Rushen thus raiAed issues quite distinct from
Remmer and Smith. Remmer and Smith addressed
only the due process right to a post-trial hearing on
jury impartiality, while Rushen raised questions of
the right of the defendant and defense counsel to be
present during mid-trial communications between
judge and juror regarding jury bias. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court did not resolve these issues
because the government conceded error and maintained that such errors were harmless. The Rushen
majority held only that if it was error to exclude the
defendant and counsel from the in-chambers communications, such error could be found harmless at a
post-trial hearing. It must be recognized that the
burden of proof at such a hearing is quite distinct
from the burden at a Smith-type hearing. Under
Smith, the defense must establish a violation of the
right to an impartial jury. Under Rushen, the prosecution must establish that violations of the right to be
present and represented by counsel are harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rushen is a very limited case because it addressed
application of the harmless error doctrine without
deciding whether error existed. Based on dicta in the
case, however, the Supreme Court seems prepared to
recognize the right to personal presence and the right
to counsel at all substantive 10 communications between judge and jury. Although the court noted that
the constitutional dimension of such rights was not in
issue in the case, the Court referred to such rights as
"fundamental rights." Having gone this far in dicta it
would be difficult for the Court to subsequently hold
that such rights are not of a constitutional dimension.
In fact, it may be difficult for the Court to stop short of
the approach taken by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals which identified four necessary components
for the proper disposition of any communication
between judge and jury. (1) The jury's inquiry should
be submitted in writing. (2) It should be marked as a
court exhibit and read into the record in the presence
of counsel and the defendant. (3) Counsel should be
afforded an opportunity to suggest appropriate responses. (4) Messages from a jury should be answered
in open court.11
Summary
Pending further clarification from the Supreme
Court, confusion will continue as to the nature of the
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various hearings on jury bias or misconduct. It is possible, however, to outline some general guidance for
counsel. (1) In situations where allegations of jury
bias or misconduct first come to light after the verdict,
the defense is entitled to a due process hearing on jury
impartiality. At such hearings, it is unclear whether
the prosecution must overcome a presumption of
prejudice (Remmer v. United States) or whether the
defense must prove actual bias (Smith v. Phillips). (2)
In cases where such allegations arise prior to verdict,
it is unclear whether the defense has a right to a midtrial hearing on jury bias. 12 (3) If the trial judge does
conduct a mid-trial hearing, there is strong dicta, but
no actual Supreme Court holding, that the defendant
and counsel have a right to participate in the hearing
(Rushen v. Spain). (4) Denial of the right to be pres1mt
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and to participate in a mid-trial hearing can later be
found to be harmless error in a post-trial hearing
where the government must prove harmlessness
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Rushen v. Spain).

FOOTNOTES

1. Clark v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 490, 115 S.E. 704 (1923).
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
2. 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
3. 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983).
4. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
5. See Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Smith v. Phil·
lips, 102 S. Ct. 940, 952 (1982).
6. 1'he prosecution in Remmer was unable to overcome the

presumption of prejudice at the post-trial hearing. Remmer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
7. 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
8. Professor Bacigal is Of Counsel in Reed v. United States,
717 F.2d 1481 (4th Cir. 1983), petition for certiari filed 1/11/84.
9. 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983).
10. "There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more
jurors does not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about
something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or
to some aspect of the trial." Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 456
(1983). It is unlikely that the Court would recognize the right to
counsel at chance encounters between judge and juror where the
conversation relates to the weather or directions to the bath·
room.
11. United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. See, Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 460 (1983), Justice
Stevens concurring.

Mortgage Financing
(continued from page 9)

ties, the amount of consideration being paid for the
option, the undivided interest in the borrower's property subject to the option, whether or not the option is
exercisable in event of default, and, in particular,
whether there is present in the transaction some
device by which the borrower may unwind or buy
back the lender's option. 4

FOOTNOTES

1. Any covenant, otherwise authorized by Jaw, that the
lender shall be entitled to share in the gross income or the net
income, or the gross rent or revenues, or net rents or revenues of
the property, or in any portion of the proceeds or appreciation
upon sale or appraisal or similar event, shall be on an equal
priority with the principal debt secured by the deed of trust, in
the event of sale to be paid next after the expenses of executing
the trust, and shall be specified in the recorded deed of trust or
other recorded document in order to be notice of record as
against subsequent parties. (Virginia Code 55-59 (5a).)
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2. Modern Mortgage Law and Practice, Second Edition, by
Robert Kratovil, J.D. and Raymond Werner, J.D., published by
Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1981.
3. Bar v. Granahan, 38 N.W. 2d 705 (Wis. Sup. Ct. (1949)).
Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1967). Hopping v. Bald·
ridge, 130 Okla. 226, 266 P.2d 469 (1928). Kreglinger v. New
Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Company, Ltd. (1914 H.L.) A.C.
25, 109 L.T.R (n.s.) 802. MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utili·
ties, Inc., 202 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1967). Multiservice Bookbinding
Ltd. and Others v. Marden, 2 All ER 489 (1978). Smith v. Smith,
82 N.H. 399, 135 A.2d 25 (1926).
4. New York has been one of the first states to propose legislation dealing with the convertible mortgage. A bill was intro·
duced in the New York State Legislature in 1983 which would
provide that an option to acquire an interest in property shall
not be unenforceable because the owner of such interest grants
such option to the holder of a mortgage which is a lien on such
property simultaneously with any Joan secured by such mortgage if (1) the power to exercise such option is not dependent
upon an occurrence of default with respect to such loan, and (2)
such loan is in the amount of $2,500,000 or more when the
option is granted. The bill did not pass the New York Senate
and Assembly in 1983 but is being reintroduced in 1984. (1983 S.
4797-A; A.6372-A)

100-X
101
102

Consolidated Exemption Supplemental Form
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Reciprocal Agreement with Other States
Virginia Initial and Annual Registration
Statement
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I. § 57-48 (2), Code of Virginia (1950).
2. Ibid.
:J. § 57-48 (aA), Code of Virginia (1950).
4. § 57.49 (A), Code of Virginia (1950).
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